To MPS: The following is an excerpt from Chapter 6 of my forthcoming biography of Milton Friedman. The chapter is a draft; feedback is welcome but please do not distribute or share. I have provided a draft of the table of contents to provide perspective on the excerpt.

THE LAST CONSERVATIVE: THE LIFE OF MILTON FRIEDMAN

Draft Table of Contents

Introduction

Part 1: Incubation

Chapter 1: America Gonif
This chapter covers Friedman’s early years in Rahway through his undergraduate years at Rutgers, with particular attention to his Jewish origins and the 1920s dominance of institutional economics.

Chapter 2: Annus Mirabilis
One chapter, one year – Friedman’s first at the University of Chicago, set against the backdrop of the Great Depression. I introduce Chicago price theory, key figures including Rose Director, Henry Simons, Aaron Director, Frank Knight, and Jacob Viner, and locate the views of Friedman’s teachers amid broader contemporary understandings of the Great Depression.

Chapter 3: The Chicago Tribe
This chapter covers Friedman’s years at both Columbia and Chicago, focusing on the emergence of a tight knit group of students and professors dedicated to price theory and increasingly skeptical of Keynesian or under-consumptionist explanations for the Depression.

Chapter 4: Wilderness Years
Here I follow Friedman’s early professional career bouncing between academic and government work, including a failed year at University of Wisconsin, stints at the National Resources Board, work at the NBER, and simmering controversy over his dissertation.

Part 2: Propagation

Chapter 5: Thorns
This chapter traces the intertwined intellectual work of Rose and Milton Friedman, excavating Rose’s sole academic publication and setting it within the couple’s family life and political commitments. The chapter is framed by two deaths: the stillbirth of their first child, and the tragic suicide of longtime friend and mentor Henry Simons.

Chapter 6: Homecoming
Beginning with Friedman’s return to Chicago as a professor, this chapter examines his early political involvement in the Mont Pelerin Society alongside the development of his interest in monetary economics and his ongoing conflict with the econometricians of the Cowles Commission.
Chapter 7: Ghosts
This chapter follows the development of Friedman’s monetarism through the money and banking workshop into an identifiable school within the field, while also tracing the success of Aaron Director’s economics teaching at the Chicago Law school. These two developments are set against a larger arc of intellectual transformation as Friedman’s views on the efficacy of markets become more pronounced and he locates himself within shifting coalitions of conservative and Republican politics.

Part 3: Harvest

Chapter 8: The New Liberal’s Creed
Moving beyond Hyde Park, this chapter opens out onto the larger political landscape of the United States, with particular attention to a revitalized conservative movement that Friedman sought to shape. In this chapter Friedman emerges as a national figure, propelled by the success of *A Monetary History of the United States*, co-authored with Anna Schwartz, and his role as economic advisor to the Goldwater campaign. I also examine the importance of his and Rose’s political manifesto, *Capitalism and Freedom*, in the development of midcentury conservatism, with a particular focus on the civil rights movement.

Chapter 9: Money Matters
In progress. Traces Friedman’s ideas about international political economy through the breakdown of Bretton Woods, stagflation, and Federal Reserve policy.

Chapter 10: The Age of Friedman
In progress. Continuing to follow Friedman’s involvement with Republican politics, this chapter shows Friedman’s ideas merging into the political mainstream during the 1980s and beyond.

Epilogue: The Last Conservative
TBD. Taking stock of Friedman’s legacy.
Excerpt from Chapter 6, Homecoming

At first, it seemed that Simons’ death had killed off the Free Market Study, too. As Hayek summarized to the Volker Fund, Simons had been “The intellectual centre of the group I had in mind.”¹ Yet Simons hadn’t actually been tasked with running the study, only serving on its executive committee. And if Simons was gone, Friedman was now in place. Hayek considered Friedman essential to the project, even hinting to the Volker Fund that the prolific Friedman might produce draft material for Director’s book.²

But in the raw aftermath of Henry’s death, Director wasn’t even sure he wanted the job. What would Chicago be without Henry? Even worse to contemplate, perhaps Henry would still be alive without the distraction and disappointment of their project. Hayek provided critical perspective, telling Director it was “even more important than before that you should accept. It seems to me the only chance that the tradition which Henry Simons created will be kept alive and continued in Chicago.”³ After some initial worry about his brother-in-law’s prospects without a guarantee of tenure, Friedman too renewed his support of the idea.⁴ Alongside Hayek, he lobbied the university to secure a higher salary for Director. By August, Director reported to Hayek, “everything is arranged.”⁵

³ F.A. Hayek to Aaron Director, July 10, 1946, Box 73, Folder 14: Correspondence with Aaron Director, F.A. Hayek Papers, Hoover Institution.
⁴ Aaron Director to F.A. Hayek, July 3, 1946, to Dir., July 10, 1946, Box 73, Folder 14: Correspondence with Aaron Director, F.A. Hayek Papers, Hoover Institution.
⁵ Aaron Director to F.A. Hayek, August 3, 1946, Box 73, Folder 14: Correspondence with Aaron Director, F.A. Hayek Papers, Hoover Institution.
Director’s move to Chicago maintained the links between the law school and the economics department – he would inherit Simons’ law school course, “Economic Analysis and Public Policy.” There was still no tenured appointment, but the Volker fund would pay Director’s salary for at least five years. In return, they hoped Director would author an American-style *Road to Serfdom*. Instead, Director turned his attention to a second Hayek project: his imagined “International Academy,” soon to be known as the Mont Pelerin Society.6

Now considered one of the founding institutions of global conservatism in the 20th century, the Mont Pelerin Society grew out of Hayek’s recognition that liberalism – the creed of limited government and open markets in which he deeply believed – had lost political purchase. In an era of social democracy, not to mention communism and fascism, the 19th century ideals of republican government seemed bound for extinction. Were it to survive, liberalism needed to be re-thought, top to bottom. Hayek was not alone in this reckoning. The first efforts to conceptualize liberalism for the modern era had arisen in Paris in the 1930s, following the publication of American journalist Walter Lippmann’s *The Good Society*. This was the moment that first got Hayek thinking about an “international organization of liberal economists.”7 The concept had a dry run of sorts in the *Colloque Lippmann*, a 1938 gathering of mostly European economists. War intervened in any follow up, and postwar, Lippmann had lost his taste for conservative politics and ideas.

Instead Hayek and *The Road to Serfdom* became the touchstones of another gathering, built upon the nucleus of the first. This time, it was clear more Americans would need to be included. Hayek reached out to those he knew personally – including Aaron Director and

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7 Burgin, 6.
George Stigler. The same discussions that led to Director’s arrival at Chicago also resulted in the Volker Fund pledging financial support to Hayek’s nascent society. A Swiss businessman also agreed to underwrite a portion of the costs. Thus Hayek was able to offer his American participants an all-expenses paid ten day trip to Europe to discuss political and economic ideas. Although he had two young children at home and had hardly settled into his new job, it was not the kind of invitation Friedman would decline. He had, in fact, never left the country. The Mont Pelerin Society would be his first step into a wider world.

The first Mont Pelerin Society meeting did not, however, mark the dawning of Friedman’s interest in questions of applied political philosophy. In fact, by the time of the meeting Friedman and Stigler had already been enmeshed in one of the definitive conflicts of the early conservative movement, an intramural quarrel over a pamphlet called *Roofs or Ceilings? The Current Housing Problem* (1946). The pamphlet had its immediate origins in conversations between Friedman and Stigler when they occupied adjacent offices at the University of Minnesota. Its deeper roots lay in Friedman’s Treasury experiences, when he had written Burns about the need for sound economic analyses of policy problems. Once back in academia, Friedman and Stigler fulfilled this earlier desire, writing up an analysis of rent control from the perspective of Chicago price theory, and began shopping it around to media outlets including *The New York Times* and *Harper’s*. Both turned it down, but a friendly editor at the *Times*, Henry Hazlitt, proposed it to a new group, the Foundation for Economic Education (FEE).

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8 In *Two Lucky People*, Friedman erroneously called the 1947 meeting “the beginning of my active involvement in the political process” (159), a statement that ignores his 1946 pamphlet *Roofs or Ceilings?*, his support of a spendings tax, his 1939 unpublished proposal for a guaranteed minimum income, and his participation in University of Chicago radio roundtables throughout the 40’s. Friedman’s statement, unfortunately, has been repeated uncritically by biographers, giving unnecessary weight to the importance of the Mont Pelerin Society and suggesting that Friedman’s interest in politics developed at a later stage in his career.

9 George Stigler to Allen Wallis, undated, circa 1946, Allen Wallis Papers, Correspondence with George Stigler, Box 10, Folder 1, University of Rochester Special Collections.
Masterminded by Leonard Read, the zealously libertarian former head of the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce, FEE was a new kind of organization – a non-profit foundation dedicated to the support of unregulated capitalism. It was part of a larger stirring across the intellectual landscape that would soon burst into view as the so-called “New Conservatism” of the 1950s, and would go on to challenge the politics of New Deal liberalism. Much as Simons had hoped to do, FEE intended to make the intellectual case for free markets. Leonard Read quickly purchased *Roof or Ceilings?*, intending it to be FEE’s inaugural publication and public debut.

No doubt FEE was attracted by the pamphlet’s timeliness. Discussion of a “housing crisis” was widespread in the postwar era, as the nation struggled to reintegrate returning veterans. Housing also connected to a central dilemma of postwar policy and politics: what to do with the various wartime controls, regulations, and bureaucracies? During the war, Friedman had quietly accepted wartime rationing and price controls, subsuming his principles to the greater goal of winning the war. Now, however, his allegiance to the price system returned.

The pamphlet’s title was a pun that summarized its argument. Americans could have more “roofs,” meaning houses – or they could have “ceilings,” meaning price controls. But they couldn’t have both. In fact, Friedman and Stigler argued that price controls had triggered the housing crisis: “the legal ceilings on rents are the reason there are so few places for rent.”

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10 Think tanks like FEE attempted to make conservatism an intellectually and socially acceptable alternative to the putative “liberal consensus” of the post-war period. Operating against well-established bodies like the liberal-leaning Brookings Institute, groups like the American Enterprise Association (now known as the American Enterprise Institute) lent a technocratic legitimacy to conservative ideals. Academics like Friedman, who joined the AEA’s Academic Advisory Board in 1956, were responsible for producing a research agenda and contributing academic expertise. The resulting partnership between interest groups, policy experts, and politicians helped to propel the rise of conservative politics in the 1950s and 60s. Jason M. Stahl, *Right Moves: The Conservative Think Tank in American Political Culture Since 1945* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2016). Read’s career is covered in Brian Doherty, *Radicals for Capitalism* and Mary Sennholz, Leonard E. Read: Philosopher of Freedom (FEE, 1993).

rent control in place, there was no incentive for additional construction. Although it seemed paradoxical, they argued that allowing housing prices to rise would ultimately create more housing stock. It was basic price theory, applied straight up to a policy dilemma.

Much like their idol Henry Simons, Friedman and Stigler were careful to link their market advocacy to the progressive value of social equality. Noting that removing rent controls would lead to wealthier people being able to buy more housing, they agreed this was problematic. The solution, however, was regulation of incomes, rather than prices. In fact, the authors explicitly declared themselves among those “who would like even more equality than there is at present, not alone for housing but for all products.”

Their argument, they stressed, was not a defense of high incomes, or inequality. In this, their argument followed Simons’ logic of taxation: remove regulations while raising rates.

Even as it reprised Simons’ emphasis on equality, the pamphlet also sounded a new theme that owed much to Friedman and Stigler’s own intellectual orientation: efficiency. The real issue with rent control was not the maldistribution of housing stock. Instead, it was bureaucracy. Rent control was wrong because it gummed up an otherwise efficient price machine. As such, the pamphlet marks a transitional moment between the Chicago school of Henry Simons and the one that would later bear Friedman’s imprint.

As it turned out, Simons-style egalitarianism had little purchase outside Chicago. Stigler had jokingly called FEE “a Tory outfit,” but he and Friedman were nonetheless

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12 *Roofs or Ceilings?*, 10.

13 How genuine had Simons’ egalitarianism actually been? In one letter to Hayek, Simons admitted to using a “low, debating trick” when he advocated public ownership of railroads. As he explained, advocating public ownership enabled him to attack regulation, which he saw as a greater evil. Simons to Hayek, Dec 18, 1934, Simons Papers, Box 2, Folder 4, University of Chicago. Similarly, Director remembered that “one of his interests in these interventionist programs was to make the private system of production palatable to his colleagues” (Kitch, 179), suggesting an element of rhetorical strategy. Yet it was undoubtedly true that Simons did believe monopolies were problematic, both for their drag on innovation and their impact on social distribution. When it came to the broader question of social equality, Simons’ views appear heartfelt, even if they contained a strong dose of social
astonished to learn that FEE considered their rhetorical nods to equality an unacceptable betrayal of the free market cause.\textsuperscript{14} As the pamphlet moved towards publication, FEE asked that the authors remove two items: a discussion of taxation, and their favorable mention of equality. Friedman and Stigler were happy to axe the discussion of taxation. But they held firm on the objectionable equality paragraph, which concluded: “It is the height of folly to permit individuals to receive unequal money incomes and then to take elaborate and costly measures to prevent them from using their incomes.”\textsuperscript{15} It was the inconsistency which galled Friedman and Stigler, but it was the hint that restricting incomes was acceptable which galled FEE.

Yet Friedman, in particular, quickly perceived that equality was the real issue. Although Stigler did most of the negotiating with FEE Director Leonard Read and his associate V.O. Watts, Friedman stayed closely involved. On the back of an envelope he scrawled the essential points at issue, insisting upon keeping the phrase “like us,” which so clearly signaled his and Stigler’s ideological commitments. “If this phrase were omitted we almost certainly would be interpreted as opposed to more equality. This [misinterpretation] seems to me more serious than possibility we will be interpreted as favoring tax program we do not favor,” he noted. Furthermore, Friedman had a clear sense of what was at stake. Imitating Simons had not been mere reflex, for Friedman stressed that the “sentence in question does not mention specific techniques for achieving equality. I believe it is essential to make it clear wherein we are criticizing means and wherein ends. The failure of liberals to emphasize their objective seems to

\textsuperscript{14} Stigler to Allen Wallis, undated, circa 1946, Allen Wallis Papers, Correspondence with George Stigler, Box 10, Folder 1.

\textsuperscript{15} \textit{Roofs or Ceilings?}, 10.
me one of chief reasons they are so often labeled reactionaries.”16 Friedman was determined that his intellectual commitments would not be misunderstood or misappropriated.

*Roofs or Ceilings*, in fact, was a bid to establish a new way of talking about capitalism in the postwar era. On the one hand, Friedman and Stigler tried to take morality and values off the table, framing rent control in terms of efficiency and stability rather than distribution. Stigler explained that their “tone of objectivity” was intended to “convince the open-minded, not those who already favor our position.”17 On the other hand, the pamphlet was not completely free of normative conclusions. Rather, they largely ceded that territory to the conventional American liberalism of the day. Greater social equality was an “end” Stigler and Friedman felt comfortable promoting. The overall message was still a bit jumbled. But the pamphlet gave a glimpse of the essential rhetorical framework Friedman would eventually perfect. He would set his efforts on behalf of capitalism in the service of creating if not equality, at least greater opportunity.

Freedom and liberty remained, for the moment, in the shadows.

The pamphlet’s turbulent history underscored just how controversial this approach was at the time. Both Friedman and Stigler made clear they did not accept the proposed changes. Friedman was tart in a follow-up letter to Leonard Read: “I am not willing to sacrifice an iota of intellectual honesty in order to have it published… if you do not wish to publish it unless we delete phrases we wished in and you do not, then I should prefer it to remain unpublished.”18 Yet as the authors only dimly understood, FEE could not let the pamphlet go unpublished, for the

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16 Friedman, notes on back of envelope from FEE to Dr. Milton Friedman, postmarked August 6, 1946, Friedman Papers, Box 38, Folder 5, Hoover Institution. These notes were a draft of a telegram Friedman sent to FEE, reproduced in Milton Friedman to Leonard Read, August 10, 1946, in J. Daniel Hammond and Claire Hammond, Eds., *Making Chicago Price Theory: Friedman-Stigler Correspondence 1945-1957* (New York: Routledge, 2006), 21. Full correspondence on the matter is found in Box 38, Milton Friedman Papers, but for ease of access citations in this chapter are made to published letters, when possible.


group had contracted with the National Real Estate Association to underwrite distribution. Rent control was not merely an important issue; it was an important issue coming up for vote in 1946, when the wartime controls would be reconsidered by a newly elected conservative Congress. This was FEE’s first big break, the chance to transform from a vanity project into a policy player, linked with a powerful corporate lobby.

Caught in a bind, FEE compromised, publishing the pamphlet as Friedman and Stigler had insisted, but appending a querulous footnote accusing the authors of putting “equality above justice and liberty.” A second publication, this one a condensed version created specifically for the National Real Estate Association, excised the offending paragraph on equality altogether. Half a million copies were printed for wide circulation.

Friedman and Stigler had been played, and they were furious. Stigler recounted a conversation with FEE official Watts to Friedman: “I must confess that I got sore as hell. I told him that it was intolerable to be pushed about by those punks in the National Real Estate Association, that there was nothing but a little dubious fame in the printing for us and the complete loss of our reputations if we started suppressing our own views. He replied (1) that after all, the income tax is a crime, threatening savings and hence employment, (2) it’s collectivistic have more equality, and we have too much now, and (3) we could always write for equality – in some other place.” In a later exchange of letters, Watts continued to attack “Robin Hood policy.” After more heated back-and-forth, Friedman and Stigler agreed to let the

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19 *Roofs or Ceilings?*, 10.
matter drop. Trying to get the article back would mean forfeiting their fee, Stigler dryly observed: “after all let’s be economic men.”

But this was not the end of the trouble Roofs or Ceilings stirred up. Friedman and Stigler were excoriated in the pages of The American Economic Review for writing “a political tract” that “unquestionably will be used as propaganda.” Responding to another economist who worried about “the kind of company you get yourself into,” Friedman admitted “the foundation which published the pamphlet turned out to be a great deal worse than we had anticipated.” Nonetheless, he did not appear discouraged: “No matter what side you take on many issues, the bedfellows you have leave a great deal to be desired.” Privately, though, Friedman told Burns the whole affair “leaves a kind of bad taste in my mouth,” even telling Burns he regretted publishing it.

From the other direction, FEE faced a barrage of criticism from prominent novelist Ayn Rand, who had been advising Leonard Read on his planned publications. A refugee from Soviet Russia, Rand detected Communist influence in the putatively objective, value-free tone of Roofs or Ceilings. As she angrily wrote to a FEE supporter, the pamphlet contained “Not one word about the inalienable right of landlords and property owners. Not one word about the inalienable right of tenants to pay whatever they wish to pay. Not one word about any kind of principles. Just expediency (will get more housing space) – and humanitarian (sic – the word is used on p.

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22 Stigler to Friedman September 3, 1946, in Making Chicago Price Theory, 33.
24 Martin Bronfenbrenner to Milton Friedman, October 5, 1946, Correspondence 1946-1948, “Roofs or Ceilings”, Box 38, File 6 Milton Friedman Papers, Hoover Institution Archives. Milton Friedman to Martin Bronfenbrenner, October 8, 1946, Correspondence 1946-1948,” Roofs or Ceilings”, Box 38, File 6, Milton Friedman Papers, Hoover Institution Archives.
25 Milton Friedman to Arthur Burns, August 15, 1946, Correspondence, Milton Friedman to Burns, 1940-1946, Box 2, Arthur F. Burns Papers, Rubenstein Library Special Collections, Duke University.
16) concern for those who can find no houses.” Friedman and Stigler’s invocation of the price system she found to be “mere window dressing, weak, ineffectual, inconclusive and unconvincing.” The episode precipitated a permanent schism between Read and Rand, who soon decided to abandon coalition building and began creating Objectivism, her own ethical and rights-based defense of free markets. It was the first sign of the recurrent tension between libertarians and conservatives that would animate postwar conservatism.

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Related tensions would also define the early years of the Mont Pelerin Society. Indeed, Leonard Read and V.O. Watts attended the society’s first meeting, in part to keep tabs on any collectivist drift among the economists. The two FEE officials were trusted gatekeepers of the Volker Fund’s president, who had agreed to pay the costs of several American attendees. Despite the Roofs or Ceilings conflict, neither Friedman nor Stigler were excluded from the society. And so in April 1947 they found themselves on a “junket to Switzerland ... to save liberalism,” as Stigler put it.

The trip was a significant undertaking; Friedman would be away from his family, and the University of Chicago, for six weeks. Rose took Janet and David to Nevada to stay with her

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27 George Stigler to Milton Friedman, December 20, 1946, in Making Chicago Price Theory, 49.
sister, while Friedman traveled in the company of George Stigler. The two men first sailed across the Atlantic on the ocean liner Queen Elizabeth, disembarking in a London that Friedman recollected as “in a sad way two years after the war.” He was particularly struck by the rigidly controlled economy and limited food supplies, which contrasted unfavorably with the more dynamic black market in France.

After a brief stay in Paris, they traveled by train to the small lakeside town of Vevey, Switzerland, where a funicular railway pulled them up to the mountaintop hamlet of Mont Pelerin. The conference was held in the belle époque Hotel du Parc, graced with a stunning chandelier in the lobby and views down to Lake Geneva from the front terrace. Here they joined an eclectic group, including Director, Knight, Hayek, Lionel Robbins, philosophers of science Karl Popper and Michael Polanyi, and the praetorians of the Volker Fund.

Henry Simons didn’t live to join the Mont Pelerin Society, but at that first meeting, it seemed as if he was nonetheless in attendance. Amid bridge, sight-seeing, and back to back sessions about the problems of the world, Friedman articulated a progressive view of classical liberalism that owed much to his deceased friend. In a discussion of the group’s agenda, Friedman argued that “Liberalism is in a curious position, and on the downgrade. It is at times used as a defense of the status quo, instead of being dynamic and progressive. We want to make sure that our manifesto is concerned in the progress of man’s welfare.” Ventriloquizing Simons, Friedman continued: “We have to agree on the necessity for a positive approach.” Similarly, Frank Knight used Simons’ exact words when he called fractional reserve banking “diabolically

28 Two Lucky People, 158-160.
29 “Discussion on Agenda, Etc., April 4, 4:30.” Minutes of Discussion at Mont Pelerin Conference, April 1st-10th 1947. Box 5, Folder 13, Mont Pelerin Papers, Hoover Institution Archives. Recorded by Dorothy Hahn, the minutes are not a full shorthand, with some sessions going unrecorded. Rather than verbatim, the gist of remarks are captured. The notes were understood to be private and not for publication. Page numbers indicated when minutes were paginated.
designed” and argued for 100% money, Simons’ pet reform of the monetary system. Director began the meeting with a carefully crafted address that emphasized the “humanitarian tradition of liberalism,” yet noted serious conflicts “between what liberals consider the social interests and the results of free enterprise.” The problem the society needed to address was that “the liberal had no solution to offer derived from their fundamental philosophy.” All this was very much in line with Hayek’s goal to reformulate a more modern, forward-looking defense of capitalism.

Not all meeting attendees agreed such a reformulation was necessary. Austrian economist Ludwig von Mises was a vocal dissenter, at one point declaring “you’re all socialists!” and storming out of the room. Mises was among a minority contingent who remained uncomfortable with any revision of liberalism that justified an expanded role for the state. He vigorously disputed the other attendees’ emphasis on monopoly, asking “why do people attack the monopoly, and not the patent law, the tariff, etc?” Following the same logic, American journalist Henry Hazlitt averred, “The biggest problem of monopoly is of government created monopoly.” FEE representative Watts took a similar hard line, arguing that “problem of [business] cycles has largely been caused by government,” and criticizing unemployment relief, a policy supported by most other members.

In this context, Friedman was undisputedly on the left side of the society. He also remained a keen internationalist. When Watts claimed there was “growing dissatisfaction in America with American intervention in Europe,” Friedman shot back quickly “I don’t think

30 “Contra-Cyclical Measures, Full Employment, and Monetary Reform, April 7, 4:30,” 6, 7. Minutes of the Mont Pelerin Society. Box 5, Folder 12, Mont Pelerin Papers, Hoover Institution Archives.
31 “Free Enterprise or Competitive Order,” April 1, 4.30, III, 3, 5. Minutes of the Mont Pelerin Society, Box 5, Folder 12, Hoover Institution Archives. Although included in meeting minutes, from their length and structure these remarks seem to be a written paper or address delivered by Director.
32 Two Lucky People, 161.
33 “Minutes, Mont Pelerin Conference, Tuesday, April 1st, 4.30.” Box 5, Folder 12, Hoover Institution Archives.
34 “Wages and Wage Policy,” Minutes of the Mont Pelerin Society, April 8, 9:30. Box 5, Folder 12, Hoover Institution Archives.
Watts’s opinions are representative of the USA.”35 The jab revealed lingering animosity from the Roof or Ceilings episode. It also showcased the palpable divide between the prewar conservatism of Watts – isolationist, moralist, rigid – and the more flexible, pragmatic, and progressive liberalism Friedman represented.

In general, though, Friedman eschewed philosophical discussion, preferring instead to propose and explain specific policies. He touted the idea of “progressive negative taxation,” an updated version of his 1939 proposal for guaranteed minimum income, now linked explicitly to the tax system. In response to questions, Friedman argued this was “a policy which is in accordance with the liberal society. Expediency is merely an additional advantage.” Even alongside this invocation of liberalism, Friedman continued to employ a strangely bloodless tone. Amplifying his thoughts about equality during a discussion of poverty, Friedman asserted “Men are not born equal… There are definitely people who cannot earn, in the marketplace, an income even that we could consider to be a minimum.” But Friedman went on to discuss this vexing social problem in an engineering idiom, noting “Other people have to pay for this help. Therefore we have progressive taxation. No democratic society is going to tolerate people starving to death, if there is food with which to feed them.”36 Was this a good thing or a bad thing? Friedman presented it as a basic social fact, drained of ethical content. While Hayek had conceived the Mont Pelerin Society as a place to discuss fundamental questions of value, Friedman continued to favor exposition of means.

As did Roof or Ceilings?, the first Mont Pelerin Society meeting provided a revealing window into churn on the American right. It laid bare a basic cleavage between those who

35 “Present Political Crisis,” Minutes of the Mont Pelerin Society, April 9, 8:30, II. Box 5, Folder 12, Hoover Institution Archives.
36 “Taxation, Poverty, and Income Distribution,” Minutes of the Mont Pelerin Society, Tuesday April 8th, 8:30pm, pp 1, 3-4, Box 5, Folder 12, Hoover Institution Archives.
wished to mount a full-throated, unapologetic defense of capitalism and the calmer, cleaner, self-consciously scientific and forward-looking vision of Friedman. At the meeting’s end, the relationship between these two strands of conservatism was far from clear. Ideologues like Rand were sure that it was a fight to the death. And surely it was significant that the group ultimately settled on the anodyne moniker “The Mont Pelerin Society,” because all other proposed names spurred irresolvable debate. The Mosaic character of the meeting also raised questions. The prophets had come down from the mountaintop, but would anyone read the tablets? How would the impassioned aristocratic tones of Hayek or the antiseptic scientism of Friedman and Stigler play in the emerging mass society of the postwar West? Ten years would lapse until Friedman attended another Mont Pelerin Society meeting. By then, he would approach these questions from a very different perspective.